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A Law-and-Community Approach to Compensation for Takings of Property under the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
Ting Xu  
 
University of Sheffield 
Abstract: Studies of takings of property highlight the increasing penetration of state power 
into private life. Controversies regularly surround compensation provisions. Many academic 
analyses and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have supported the proposition 
that market value offers the best approximation of just compensation. However, full market 
value compensation may not be guaranteed if the taking of property fulfils certain legitimate 
objectives of the µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ To unpack the complexity surrounding compensation 
provisions under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), this article adopts and 
develops a µODZ-and-FRPPXQLW\¶ approach ʹ an important dimension, not previously 
investigated in the study of takings of property ʹ  which sees µcommunity¶ as networks of social 
relations, and views law as not only grounded in community but also existing to regulate 
communal networks. This article then identifies the limits of both Article 1, Protocol 1 of the 
ECHR and the current approaches to compensation in the light of this law-and-community 
approach. In so doing, the article makes a distinctive contribution by offering a new socio-legal 
interpretation of controversies surrounding compensation for takings of property beyond the 
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private/public divide and by proposing an alternative framework of engaging law and 
regulation in wider social life.   
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Introduction 
The drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights µECHR¶ by the then newly 
formed Council of Europe in 1950 came about after a period of authoritarian rule in Europe, 
and marked a shift in the endeavour to constrain state power to protect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.1  At the same time, however, the Contracting States were reluctant to 
compromise political decisions on issues such as expropriation, in particular nationalisation, 
which is often carried out to pursue ambitious economic and social policies.2 It is therefore not 
surprising that the Contracting States could not reach agreement on the inclusion of the 
protection of property rights as human rights in the Convention itself.3 As a result, the ECHR 
affords some protection against expropriation, but it grants states a very wide µPDUJLQ of 
                                                 
1
 C Golay and I Cismas µ/HJDO Opinion: The Right to Property from a Human Rights 3HUVSHFWLYH¶ SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester NY: Social Science Research Network, 2010), available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1635359&rec=1&srcabs=1304699&alg=1&pos=9 
(accessed 9 June 2018) p 5.  
2
 TRG van Banning The Human Right to Property (Antwerp: Intersentia, 2001) p 79.  
3
 B Rainey, E Wicks, and C Ovey The European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2014) p 492. For the difficulty of engaging property rights with human rights, see T Xu and J Allain µ,QWURGXFWLRQ 
Property and Human Rights in a Global &RQWH[W¶ in T Xu and J Allain (eds) Property and Human Rights in a 
Global Context (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015) p1.   
  
DSSUHFLDWLRQ¶ The right to property was eventually included in Article 1, Protocol 1 (µ$3¶), 
adopted in 1952:  
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. 
No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to 
the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law. 
 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to 
enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance 
with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or 
penalties.  
 
This Article can be broken down into µWKUHH distinct UXOHV¶ a general right to property (the first 
sentence of the first paragraph); a set of principles concerning the deprivation of possessions 
(the second sentence of the first paragraph);4 and a right of states to control the use of property 
(the second paragraph).5  The second and third rules constitute limitations to the right to 
property to µPLQLPL]H the impact of [A1P1] on state power over SURSHUW\¶.6 These limitations 
speak to the Contracting 6WDWHV¶ emphasis on µWKH social function of SURSHUW\¶ which allows 
for reasonable constraints on the use of private property in order to secure the public interest.7 
                                                 
4
 See eg, Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden (1983) 5 EHRR 35, at [61]; James v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 
123, at [37]; Lithgow v United Kingdom (1986) 8 EHRR 329, at [106].  
5
 See eg, JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 45, at [52].  
6
 T Allen µ&RPSHQVDWLRQ for Property under the European Convention on Human 5LJKWV¶ (2006-07) Mich J ,QW¶O 
L 287 at 295.  
7
 See eg, Art 14(2) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949 µ3URSHUW\ entails obligations. Its 
use shall also serve the public JRRG¶ Art 42(2) of the Italian Constitution 1948 µPrivate ownership is recognized 
  
In Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, the European Court of Human Rights (µ(&W+5¶ stated 
that it µPXVW determine whether a fair balance was struck between the demands of the general 
interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the LQGLYLGXDO¶V 
fundamental ULJKWV¶.8 
In correspondence with the three rules above, three important questions often arise in 
considering cases concerning takings of property. Is there a violation of A1P1? If so, does the 
taking constitute the µGHSULYDWLRQ of RZQHUVKLS¶ or simply µVWDWH control over the use of 
SURSHUW\¶" Is the applicant entitled to compensation and, if so, then what constitutes just 
compensation?  
A1P1 itself does not specify compensation provisions. When A1P1 was drafted, the 
representatives of the Contracting States µUHMHFWHG every proposal that contained a reference to 
comSHQVDWLRQ¶ they feared that the specification of compensation provisions would 
compromise the implementation of fundamental economic and social policies.9 That said, 
A1P1 contains µDQ implied right to FRPSHQVDWLRQ¶ as the µfair balance¶ test set out in Sporrong 
and Lönnroth v Sweden entails that the state must provide compensation that is µUHDVRQDEO\ 
related to the value of the SURSHUW\¶.10 Many academic works in the discourses of human rights, 
and decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, have supported the proposition that 
market value offers the best approximation of just compensation.11 However, market value 
                                                 
and guaranteed by the law, which determines the manner of acquisition and enjoyment as well as its limits, in 
order to ensure its social function and to make it accessible to DOO¶  
8
 Sporrong and Lönnroth v Sweden, above n 4, at [69].  
9
 Allen, above n 6, p 295.  
10
 James v United Kingdom, above n 4, at [54]; Allen, above n6, p 288.  
11
 Allen, above n 6, p 290.  
  
compensation is not necessarily guaranteed if takings of property are for public purposes, and 
indeed, in the µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶.  
Further, the (&+5¶V approach to the protection of the right to property is essentially 
individualistic, affording only limited scope for the protection of communal rights, which are 
often understood to contrast with individual rights. Treating communal property rights as a 
fundamental human right is highly contentious.12 The µfair balance¶ test primarily concerns the 
conflict between individual and public interests. Takings which impact communal networks 
located within and beyond the boundaries of a single society or nation state have not provoked 
much discussion and analysis. 
This article seeks to decipher the complexity of takings of property and relevant compensation 
provisions under the ECHR as they apply to property in general and communal property in 
particular. Drawing on Roger &RWWHUUHOO¶V law-and-community approach that sees 
µcommunity¶ 13  as networks of social relations, and views law as not only grounded in 
community but also existing to regulate social relations,14 this article gives an innovative, 
socio-legal interpretation of controversies surrounding compensation for takings of property. 
                                                 
12
 T Xu and W Gong µ&RPPXQDO Property Rights in International Human Rights Instruments: Implications for 
De Facto ([SURSULDWLRQ¶ in T Xu and J Allain (eds) Property and Human Rights in a Global Context (Oxford: 
Hart Publishing) p 225 at p 239.  
13
 The term µFRPPXQLW\¶ is invoked as both an abstraction and an empirical description. I use the single form of 
community when referring to the abstraction of its meaning and the plural form when referring to empirical 
examples of communities. See Section 1 for more discussion.  
14
 See eg, R Cotterrell Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2006) pp 65-78; R Cotterrell µ&RPPXQLW\ as a Legal Concept? Some Uses of a Law-and-Community Approach 
in Legal 7KHRU\¶ in R Cotterrell Living Law: Studies in Legal and Society Theory (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008) pp 
17-28.  
  
Investigating the law-and-community approach in the context of takings of property in general, 
this article considers two interrelated questions: What makes a taking socially justified?  What 
constitutes just compensation? Developing this approach in the context of takings of communal 
property, this article further analyses the treatment of communal networks adversely affected 
by takings under ECtHR jurisprudence and questions whether a compensation package should 
include the restoration of these communal networks. In so doing, the paper offers a 
comprehensive reevaluation of compensation provisions for takings of property under the 
ECHR and proposes an alternative framework of engaging law and regulation in wider social 
life.   
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 of this paper invokes the concept of 
community and offers a fresh analysis of the law-and-community approach and its relevance 
for studying takings of property.  Sections 2 and 3 apply the law-and-community approach to 
examining two interrelated issues. The first is whether µFRPPXQLW\¶ interests are properly taken 
into account in A1P1 and by the ECtHR in identifying the notion of µpossessions¶ (Section 2). 
The second is whether the importance of µFRPPXQLW\¶ is appropriately taken into account by 
the ECtHR in evaluating issues such as fair balance and proportionality and in assessing 
compensation (Section 3).   Section 3(c) specifically examines cases involving indigenous 
peoples and communal property before the ECtHR. Due to limited space, the paper focuses on 
A1P1 under the ECHR and takings in the UK and Europe, although it does draw some 
comparative perspectives from the American system.15  
                                                 
15
 I am aware that there are different approaches within the common law system, bearing in mind that the United 
States and the Republic of Ireland have written constitutions. For the Irish system, see eg, U. Kilkelly (ed) ECHR 
  
1 A Law-and-Community Approach  
(a) Invoking the Concept of µ&RPPXQLW\¶  
As an old social science concept, there are many interpretations of what community is or should 
be.16 It may be better understood with reference to some common characteristics or bonds that 
hold people together. Locality is important; people are often bound together via living in a 
common place. That said, community is not merely a geographical notion, as people may be 
bound together by a common interest that transcends the territorial boundaries. Community 
may be formed by a distinctive network of social relations or style of life (for example, the 
community of farmers, pastoral community, etc.).17 Community may also be shaped by a strong 
sense of connection or belonging, for example, many communities have members who share a 
distinctive µidentity¶ (for example, indigenous community).18  
The law-and-community approach developed by Roger Cotterrell sees µFRPPXQLW\¶ as 
networks of social relations held together by a variety of bonds (eg, convergence of economic 
interests, shared customs and common values).19 In this approach, the idea of community 
differs from our usual understanding that sees community as physical and geographical entities 
                                                 
and Irish Law (Bristol: Jordan Publishing, 2nd edn, 2009). Beyond the ECHR, international law, international 
human rights treaties and investment and trade treaties, in particular, the Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), 
provide other sources for determining the VWDWH¶V obligation to property owners.  
16
 See eg F Tönnies Community and Civil Society, trans. CP Loomis (Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 
2002 [1887]); B Anderson Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: 
Verso, 1991); T Blackshaw Key Concepts in Community Studies (London: Sage, 2010).  
17
 J Clarke µ&RPPXQLW\¶ in DM Nonini (ed) A Companion to Urban Anthropology (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 
2014) p 46 at pp 47-48.  
18
 Ibid, at p 48.  
19
 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, at p 74.  
  
or simple agglomerations of individuals. Instead, it suggests µD diversity of social collectivities, 
commitments and systems of interests, values or beliefs, coexisting, overlapping and 
interpenetratLQJ¶.20 To put it another way, community µLV not a thing but a quality of social 
relations¶.21 Seen through the lens of community, abstract society is disaggregated µLQWR many 
different networks of social relations in and beyond nation VWDWHV¶.22  
Drawing on :HEHU¶V four ideal types of social action (traditional, affectual, instrumentally 
rational and value-rational),23 Cotterrell¶V networks of community encompass four ideal types 
of community: instrumental community, traditional community, community of belief, and 
affective community. ,QWKLVDSSURDFKRQHLGHDOW\SHRIFRPPXQLW\HJFRPPXQLW\RIEHOLHI
LVQRWWREHHTXDWHGZLWKRQHHPSLULFDOPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIFRPPXQLW\HJDFKXUFKUDWKHULW
UHSUHVHQWVDGLVWLQFWLYHW\SHRIµFROOHFWLYHLQYROYHPHQW¶DQGFDQEHFRPELQHGZLWKRWKHUW\SHV
RIFRPPXQLW\µLQFRPSOH[ZD\VLQDFWXDOJURXSOLIH¶24 
Referring to the four types of community, instrumental community is mainly driven by 
economic and utilitarian values and interests. Traditional community is based on co-existence 
in the shared environment including the same locality, cultural and social tradition, historical 
experience, and so on. Affective community is shaped by emotion or friendship, which is often 
significant when dealing with issues regarding marriage and divorce, succession, and elderly 
                                                 
20
 Ibid, p 67. 
21
 R Cotterrell µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO Legal Authority: A Socio-Legal 3HUVSHFWLYH¶ in R Cotterrell and M Del Mar (eds) 
Authority in Transnational Legal Theory (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2016) p 253 at p 273. Italics original.  
22
 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, above n14, p 65. 
23
 M Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, E Fischoff (trans) (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1978 [1921-1922]) pp 23-26.  
24
 R Cotterrell µ$ Legal Concept of &RPPXQLW\¶ (1997) 12 Canadian Journal of Law and Society 75 at 81.  
  
support; and community of belief focuses on aspects of social relationships defined by shared 
beliefs or commitment to a certain value (ethical, aesthetic, religious, and so on). 25 Taken 
together, traditional community, affective community, and community of belief are regarded 
as µnon-instrumental¶ in Cotterrell¶s characterisation.  
In social reality, these types of community µUDUHO\ exist in pure IRUP¶ but often µinteract in 
complex ways as networks of FRPPXQLW\¶.26 A communal network can exist at the local, 
national, supranational, international, or transnational level; each can comprise any or all of the 
four types of community. As discussed above, the basis of holding community together is 
various bonds. People can be members of different communal networks; their memberships 
are often µWUDQVLHQW¶ and µIOXFWXDWLQJ¶.27 Communal networks can also be µULIH with conflict and 
power VWUXJJOHV¶.28 For example, a nation-state, as a national communal network, usually 
encompasses all four types of community. But whether a nation-state is µLPDJLQHG¶ by its 
citizens to be unified largely depends on the type of community within the nation-state they 
regard as the most important and the type of community that  dominates the national communal 
                                                 
25
 Cotterrell, µ&RPPXQLW\ as a Legal &RQFHSW"¶, above n14, p 23; Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, above n 
14, pp 165-166. See also T Xu µ*OREDO Legal Transplants through the Lens of Community: Lessons for and from 
Chinese Property /DZ¶ in A Perry-Kessaris (ed) Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, 
Context and Subtext (London: Routledge, 2013) p 167 at p 170.  
26
 Cotterrell, µ&RPPXQLW\ as a Legal &RQFHSW"¶, above n14, p 17 and p 23.  
27
 R Cotterrell µ5HWKLQNLQJ ³(PEHGGHGQHVV´ Law, Economy, &RPPXQLW\¶ (2013) 40 Journal of Law and Society 
49 at 56.  
28
 M-L Djelic and S Quack µ7UDQVQDWLRQDO Communities and Their Impact on the Governance of Business and 
Economic $FWLYLW\¶ in M-L Djelic and S Quack (eds) Transnational Communities: Shaping Global Economic 
Governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) p 377 at p 383.  
  
network. 29 Different communal networks point to different regulatory challenges.30  To make 
these relations stronger and better governed therefore requires regulation to maintain a certain 
degree of stability and a sense of collective belonging not only within various types of 
community but also between them.  
 (b) Developing the Law-and-Community Approach  
The notion of µODZ¶ taken in the law-and-community approach extends beyond µWKH ³RIILFLDO´ 
legal system of the VWDWH¶.31 It includes international law, transnational law and other non-state 
forms of institutionalised doctrine. In this regard, the law-and-community approach shares 
common ground with the literature on µlegal pluralism¶ whose central idea concerns µWKH 
coexistence, and sometimes conflict, of legal regimes and sources of legal DXWKRULW\¶. 32 
Moreover, a communal network, the unit of analysis in the law-and-community approach, 
resembles µWKH semi-autonomous social ILHOG¶ which is a subject of anthropological study. The 
semi-autonomous social field µFDQ generate rules and customs and symbols internally, EXW«LW 
                                                 
29
 R Cotterrell, ³%UH[LW through a Community /HQV´ SLSABlog, 4 July 2016, Italics in original, available at 
http://slsablog.co.uk/blog/blog-posts/brexit-through-a-community-lens/ (accessed 9 June 2018). 
30
 See also A Perry-Kessaris Global Business, Local Law: The Indian Legal System as a Communal Resource in 
Foreign Investment Relations (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2008); A Perry-Kessaris µ5HDGLQJ the Story of 
Law and Embeddedness through a Community Lens: A Polanyi-Meets-Cotterrell Economic Sociology of /DZ"¶ 
(2011) 62 NILQ 401.  
31
 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, above n 14, p 1.  
32
 Ibid. There is a rich literature on legal pluralism and the recognition of normative and customary rules. See eg, 
PS Berman µ*OREDO Legal Pluralism: Past to Present, Local to *OREDO¶ (2007) 80 Southern California Law Review 
1155; B. Tamanaha µ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ Legal 3OXUDOLVP¶ (2008) 30 Sydney Law Review 375; W Twining µ1RUPDWLYH 
and Legal Pluralism: A Global 3HUVSHFWLYH¶ (2010) 20 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 473.  
  
is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by 
which it is VXUURXQGHG¶.33  
However, the law-and-community approach differs from pluralist views of law. To adopt the 
law-and-community approach does not claim any superiority or desirability of those relations 
of community; we live within such relations. These relations may be strong or fragile, well or 
poorly governed.34 Communal networks may embody hierarchy, inequality, patriarchy and 
privilege. For example, ZRPHQ¶V property rights are often ignored, or even suppressed, in a 
communal context. Since a communal network may not be structured to ensure equality, the 
law that expresses and frames a communal network may be regarded as unjust and illegitimate 
by some of the members of the communal network. Under such circumstances, a much larger, 
powerful communal network and its law (eg, the state and state law) may attempt to control 
smaller, less powerful communal networks and µremedy¶ community norms. Here µWR UHPHG\¶ 
community norms means to bring these community norms into conformity with the norms of 
the more powerful communal network.  
In employing the law-and-community approach to analyse takings of property, we can identify 
three-levels for analysis: the interaction between individuals, the communal network(s) he/she 
belongs to, and the local/national/supranational/international authorities with respect to the 
enforcement of law. The first level concerns the LQGLYLGXDO¶V perception of law. µ6RPH people 
may choose to emphasise one type of community [and one set of legal concerns] as important 
because of personal experience linked to their interest, emotional allegiances, beliefs, or sense 
                                                 
33
 SF Moore µ/DZ and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of 6WXG\¶ 
(1973) 7 Law and Society Review 719 at 720.  
34
 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society, above n 14, p 77.  
  
of their conditions of existence in their HQYLURQPHQW¶.35 The second level deals with communal 
networks and the law operating in each of these networks.  The rules and norms generating 
from one network coexist, overlap, and interpenetrate with rules and norms generating from 
other networks. The processes through which these networks interact with each other also 
affect the extent to which national/supranational/international law can be accommodated in 
these networks it purports to regulate. The third level concerns the penetration of 
national/supranational/international law into less powerful communal networks, which may 
lead to the changes of community norms and rules generating from these networks.  
Supranational/international law such as the ECHR is often closely linked to particular types of 
community (eg, smaller networks of law makers) and therefore has an enduring problem of 
securing cultural legitimacy when it tries to regulate all types of community.36 Here cultural 
legitimacy refers to legitimacy of the law that each communal network creates that is µGHULYHG 
directly from the cultural conditions of the network itself (from the common interests of its 
members, from its unifying beliefs or values, from its traditions, collective allegiances, HWF¶.37  
Turning to the conception of property, one of the key issues in examining takings of property, 
the law-and-community approach further allows us to recognise a plethora of types of property 
rooted in various communal networks and their cultural conditions, in particular, communal 
forms of property, encompassing both spatial and temporal dimensions. For example, people 
share a sense of belonging via living in a common place, and they follow the same rules of the 
                                                 
35
 Cotterrell, above n 29. He argues that µPDQ\ people, reported as advocating ³UHPDLQ´ seemed to rely on the 
image of the UK as a primarily economic communal QHWZRUN¶ but lacked the attention to the national environment 
of co-existence and threats to it.  
36
 Cotterrell, above n 21. 
37
 Ibid, p 274.  
  
use of resources which may be intergenerational but not yet amount to customary. Some groups 
such as fisherfolk, herders and pastoralists may hold customary land rights. While the 
legitimacy of customary land rights derives from custom,38 indigenous peoplHV¶ resource use 
is integral to their cultural identity.39  Likewise, this approach allows us to recognise pluralist 
property norms derived from varied sources ranging from custom and national law to 
international and supranational law (eg, European Union Law and human rights law). As 
discussed above, international/supranational law often lacks cultural legitimacy. A review of 
the scope of A1P1 and current approaches to compensation for takings of property in the light 
of the law-and-community approach will help us decipher the complexity of the engagement 
of the ECHR, as a supranational legal authority, with different types of communal networks 
and property norms.  
                                                 
38
 For a definition of µFXVWRPDU\ ODZ¶ see FG Snyder µ&RORQLDOLVP and Legal Form: The Creation of ³&XVWRPDU\ 
/DZ´ in 6HQHJDO¶ (1981) 19 J. Legal Pluralism 49 at 49:  
µ7KH notion of ³FXVWRPDU\ ODZ´ in Africa and elsewhere was specific to particular historical 
circumstances. It belonged to an ideology that generally accompanied and formed part of colonial 
domination. Both the concrete legal form and its conceptualization resulted from changes in social 
relations associated with the transformation of precapitalist modes of production and the sub-sumption 
of precapitalist social formations within the capitalist world HFRQRP\¶  
The formation of the notion of µFXVWRPDU\ ODZ¶ highlights the complexity involved in the three-level analysis of 
the interaction between individuals, communal networks, and authorities with respect to the enforcement of law 
discussed above.  
39
 T Xu and W Gong µ7KH Legitimacy of Extralegal Property: Global Perspectives and &KLQD¶V ([SHULHQFH¶ (2016) 
67 NILQ 189 at 195-196.  
  
2 Reviewing the Notion of µ3RVVHVVLRQV¶ in A1P1 and its Implications for Conceptualising 
Takings of Property  
There are significant differences between civil law and common law approaches to the concept 
of property. In civil law jurisdictions, µWKH idea of the ³absolute´ character of the domination 
over a thing was « closely connected with that of its ³inviolability´ and ³sanctity´ which 
derived its polemical pathos from the fight against feudal burdens and UHVWULFWLRQV¶.40 Against 
this backdrop, the French Civil Code of 1804 gives µDQ absolute right to the enjoyment and 
disposal of SURSHUW\¶.41 By contrast, µ(QJOLVK law did not experience the violent [reception of 
this idea] which occurred on the Continent¶ or any radical statutory intervention.42 As a result, 
English law µhas preserved a large variety of rights of SRVVHVVLRQ¶.43 A1P1 has an important 
task to minimise these differences.  
The closest equivalent to the English term µproperty¶ or µpossession¶ is the French word bien,44 
a term different from propriété which refers to the absolute notion of ownership in French law.45 
But this is not the perfect translation: µwhile the term bien usually refers only to the object of 
                                                 
40
 K Renner The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions (New Brunswick, New Jersey: 
Transaction Publishers, 2010 [1949]) p 66.  
41
 HJ Laski The Rise of European Liberalism: An Essay in Interpretation (London: Unwin Books, 1962) p 148.  
42
 Renner, above n 40, p 82. 
43
 Ibid, p 82. See also T Murphy, S Roberts, and T Flessas Understanding Property Law (London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 2004) p 61 (arguing that µWKH fulcrum of the English system of remedies is possession rather than 
RZQHUVKLS¶ 
44
 Collins Compact French Dictionary, 2nd edition (Glasgow: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009) p 21. See also S 
Praduroux µ2EMHFWV of Property Rights: Old and 1HZ¶ in M Graziadei and L Smith (eds) Comparative Property 
Law: Global Perspectives (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017) p 51at p 53.  
45
 Praduroux, ibid, p 54.  
  
rights, in the common law lexicon, the term ³property´ indicates both property rights and the 
object of property rights¶46 The British representatives observed that µWKH word ³SRVVHVVLRQV´ 
used in the English text, is not a really satisfactory ZRUG«,W is a word that would not be found, 
in a British Act of Parliament or any other GRFXPHQW¶.47 
Some guidance on interpreting the meaning of possessions in A1P1 comes from comparative 
law. Some comparative property lawyers have rejected the existence of µa watertight 
separation¶ between civil law and common law approaches to property.48  
Comparisons of property laws require an understanding of what is living law, governing 
and structuring social practice and social expectations through working rules, and what 
are instead the intellectual tools that jurists and lawmakers use to rationalise, structure, 
and represent social dynamics in legal terms.49  
This argument can be supported and further explained by applying the law-and-community 
approach. It is difficult to unify the conceptions of property, especially when we consider the 
fact that µthe law of property in force in each jurisdiction is set out, explained, and framed by 
the legislature, the courts, government agencies, academic scholarship, social actors, and 
movements¶ 50  This observation chimes with what has been emphasised in the law-and-
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community approach that law has different community groundings and is created, interpreted, 
and enforced by various agencies. If we are going to examine the extent to which the ECHR 
unifies the notions of property in A1P1, we need to look at the relevant case law of the ECtHR. 
We also need to bear in mind that those cases have been decided by a small network of judges 
and that the conceptual tools that jurists and lawmakers use to represent social dynamics may 
be quite different from the social dynamics themselves.   
In Gasus-Dosier und Fördertechnik v The Netherlands, the scope of the notion of possessions 
in A1P1 has expanded from ownership of physical goods to certain rights and interests.51 The 
ECtHR held that the notion of possessions µKDV an autonomous meaning which is certainly not 
limited to ownership of physical goods: certain other rights and interests constituting assets can 
also be regarded as ³SURSHUW\ ULJKWV´ and thus ³SRVVHVVLRQV´ for the purposes of this 
SURYLVLRQ¶ 52  The autonomous meaning of possessions under the ECHR recognises that 
µ³SRVVHVVLRQV´ are created by national law, but that the Court is free to reach its own conclusion 
on the application of national law to the specific facts of the FDVH¶ 53  µ7KLV represents a 
pragmatic solution to the problem which arises when the parties cannot agree on whether the 
applicant has a proprietary interest under national ODZ¶54 The ECtHR adopts a conservative 
approach to the definition of possessions, as it is wary of the creation of new proprietary 
interests that are not recognised under national law.  
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Apart from generally recognised real and personal property, categories of possessions now 
include company shares, 55  goodwill in a business, 56  intellectual property rights such as 
patents,57 security rights under a retention of title clause,58 planning permission,59 rights of 
user,60 and so on.61 The ECtHR has also extended the scope of possessions to include µWKH 
DSSOLFDQWV¶ legitimate expectation of being able to carry out their proposed GHYHORSPHQW¶.62 
Further, µ ³SRVVHVVLRQV´ can be either ³H[LVWLQJ SRVVHVVLRQV´ or assets, including claims, in 
respect of which the applicant can argue that he or she has at least a ³OHJLWLPDWH H[SHFWDWLRQ´ 
of obtaining effective enjoyment of a property ULJKW¶.63 µ$ legitimate expectation must have a 
³VXIILFLHQW basis in national ODZ´¶.64  The court, therefore, has adopted µDQ economic value 
approach to the notion of SRVVHVVLRQV¶ that include both present and future economic interests.65  
Through adopting the economic value approach, the Convention meaning of possessions serves 
as a unifying concept that minimises the differences among the Contracting States in 
interpreting the notion of property to a certain extent. However, it is not sufficiently broad to 
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include communal land, cultural resources and other communal interests. As discussed in 
Section 1(b), the ECHR, one kind of supranational law, is grounded in a confined communal 
network that is much narrower than the communal network made up of the population it is 
purported to regulate. Every communal network has its predominant interest, which the ECHR 
has not sufficiently taken into account.66  
The limited content of possessions is closely linked to the narrow conception of the taking of 
property, that is, the taking of private property from its owner by the state or an authority for 
the public interest. There is only a very limited appreciation of the impact of takings on 
communal networks bound together by tradition, customs, or language. What about those 
instances where the exercise of regulatory power leads to the deprivation of access to land and 
other natural resources, or to the weakening of control over land and other natural resources 
by people who may hold nothing other than use rights to land and natural resources (for 
example, traditional possession of their lands by indigenous people)?67  In those cases there is 
often a lack of informed consent and/or compensation. Should those cases be considered as 
takings of property? Are those people entitled to compensation? Should the compensation 
provisions be solely measured by the economic terms? Could the ECHR engage with wider, 
diverse communal networks? If so, in what way? The following section explores these 
questions in the light of the law-and-community approach.  
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3 Reviewing the Current Approaches to Compensation for Takings of Property 
(a) The Market Value Approach  
Many disputes arising from takings of property centre on whether market value compensation 
should be paid.68 The market value approach sees market value as the best approximation for 
justice and considers µWKH nature and economic impact of the regulation and its interference 
with reasonable investment-backed expeFWDWLRQV¶.69 In theory, this approach should work well 
if the taking primarily concerns instrumental community, whose µVFRSH and limits >«@ are 
usually relatively FOHDU¶ 70  Further, money seems to be the language of instrumental 
community, and monetary compensation is consistent with the logic of instrumental 
community and serves as the basic form/medium/expression of interaction. For example, the 
economic value approach to the notion of µSRVVHVVLRQV¶ discussed in Section 2 is consistent 
with the market value approach to compensation.  
To be sure, the market value approach to compensation is based on an understanding that all 
property is to be µfungible¶ and µIXOO\ interchangeable with PRQH\¶.71  However, it is not 
entirely incompatible with the social approach to compensation, because ultimately the market 
value reflects µD community FRQVHQVXV¶ on the value of the property rather than the RZQHU¶V 
idiosyncratic preference.72 It should be noted, however, that community interest/community 
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consensus in the context of A1P1 is often used interchangeably with public interest/public 
consensus.   
The µIDLU EDODQFH¶ test discussed in the Introduction accommodates individual desires and plans 
with respect to RQH¶V property, but only to a certain extent. In some cases, market value 
compensation seems inappropriate from the property RZQHU¶V point of view. For instance, µD 
longtime owner of a single-family home in a stable residential area might not willingly part 
with his dwelling except a substantial premium over the market SULFH¶73 The owner would even 
expect a much larger amount of compensation than the market value if his/her experience of 
living in the property is closely linked to a non-instrumental communal network that is based 
on co-existence in common environment. Sometimes well-intended policies to replace slums 
or old terraced housing with µUDWLRQDOO\ GHVLJQHG¶ blocks (no compensation involved in most 
cases) took no consideration of non-instrumental community that is essential to generate and 
sustain networks of dependence and mutual support.74 Perhaps the owner is never going to be 
satisfied even if a compensation package is offered and much higher than the market value, for 
their losses can never be measured in monetary terms. These situations reflect the complexity 
demonstrated in the law-and-community approach that an individual belongs to any or all of 
the types of community; and that each community is an ideal type and the types overlap in 
reality. Instrumental communal networks also include non-instrumental elements.  
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In some cases where public interests outweigh private interests, less than reimbursement of the 
full market value may be awarded by the ECtHR:75  
A taking of property under the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 
without payment of an amount reasonably related to its value will normally constitute 
a disproportionate interference that cannot be justified under Article 1. The provision, 
does not, however, guarantee a right to full compensation circumstances, since 
legitimate objectives of ³SXEOLF LQWHUHVW´ may call for less than reimbursement of the 
full market value.76 
Many issues remain largely unresolved. For example, how to calculate market value when there 
is a decrease in the value of the property due to state control of the property? 77  Should 
µSRVVHVVLRQV¶ always include future profits if there had been development of the area?  
Moreover, whether the taking is considered by the ECtHR to constitute µGHSULYDWLRQ of 
ownersKLS¶ or µVWDWH control over the use of SURSHUW\¶ will lead to different consequences. The 
deprivation of ownership usually guarantees compensation (not necessarily with full market 
value if it is for the public interest), whereas state control of the use of property (even though 
the applicant had lost possessions) does not always give rise to an entitlement to compensation.   
Pye v United Kingdom is a seminal case highlighting this distinction, which is blurred and 
subject to debate.  
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The ECtHR ruled that µthe applicant companies were >«@ affected, not by a ³GHSULYDWLRQ of 
SRVVHVVLRQV´ within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1, but 
rather by a ³FRQWURO of XVH´ of land within the meaning of the second paragraph of the 
proviVLRQ¶.78 The second paragraph of A1P1 reserves to the states the right to enact such laws 
as they deem necessary to control the use of property according to general interest. To put it 
another way, states enjoy a wide margin of appreciation with regard to choosing the means of 
enforcement of the law and ascertaining whether such enforcement will be justified in the 
general interest.79 The initial assessment of whether there exists a public interest in justifying 
the taking of property is often left to the national authorities.  
However, the debates whether there was real public or general interest in the law on adverse 
possession in the case of registered land remain largely unresolved. This is due in part to the 
fact that the function of the property in question is interpreted in different ways. In Pye, the 
UK government argument was that µODQG was a limited resource, and it was in the public interest 
that it should be used, maintained and LPSURYHG¶. 80  This argument seems to have focused on 
the economic function of the property. The applicant companies could have relied on a different 
argument: 
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 [the interference with their property] shows disrespect for the legitimate rights and 
expectations of the registered property owners which include the possibility of keeping 
their property unused for development at a more appropriate time « or... maintain[ing] 
their property as security for their children or grandchildren.81  
This argument seems to have emphasised the conservation function of the property in question. 
Again seen in the light of the law-and-community approach, the conceptions of the function of 
property, fair balance, and compensation provision largely depend on interactions between the 
individual, the communal network(s) he/she belongs to, and the wider society with respect to 
the property in issue. Leaving the initial assessment of whether there exists a public interest to 
the national authorities without considering such interactions will make some of the (&W+5¶V 
decisions controversial.  
(b) The Social Approach and Proportionality 
The social approach to compensation emphasises the social function of property, which allows 
for reasonable constraints on the use of private property in order to secure the public interest 
and even state sanctions of extinguishment of title.  The µVRFLDO-function QRUP¶ of property was 
proposed by the French law professor Léon Duguit in the early twentieth century82 and later 
appeared in several national constitutions such as the Italian Constitution 1948 and the Basic 
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 1949.83 Property in this kind of characterisation 
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entails a certain number of obligations to serve the social interest. 84  For example, the 
ODQGRZQHU¶V rights to control exclusive access to property may be limited as a matter of the 
relationship between property and equality.85 There are many categories of µquasi-proprietary¶ 
public rights of access to private land such as the public right to use the highway, walkway 
agreements, and µWKH right to URDP¶ comprising the right of access to private land for 
recreational purposes such as hiking.86 3URSHUW\¶V social function restricts the extent to which 
private property rights can be exercised.  
 
A1P1 recognises both rights and obligations in relation to property. This recognition echoes 
Roscoe 3RXQG¶V argument that rights are µLQWHUHVWV to be VHFXUHG¶ and that society evolves from 
µLQGLYLGXDO LQWHUHVWV¶ to µVRFLDO LQWHUHVWV¶. 87  People perceive justice in relation to their 
interests.88 So the law regulating property needs to take account of both the interests of the 
individual and the interests of society in connection with the property in question.89  For 
example, the key issue in the µfair balance¶ test is to strike a balance between individual and 
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social interests; this test encompasses three important aspects, namely, legitimate aim (closely 
linked to the µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶),  proportionality90  between means and aim, and compensation 
relevant to proportionality.  
Although many studies have critiqued the concept of proportionality, 91  they have not 
sufficiently explored the meaning of the µSXEOLF LQWHUHVW¶ and its implications for understanding 
proportionality. Often we talk about the µSXElic LQWHUHVW¶ as if it is unitary. In the Anglo-
American tradition, for example, µLW was thought of as representing a FRPPXQLW\¶V collective 
values, transcending the interests or identified preferences of individuals and beyond the ability 
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of individuals to achieve by acting DORQH¶92 This unitary conception of the public interest hides 
conflicting policy considerations. The Kelo litigation, albeit a US example, exemplifies those 
conflicts.93 It raises many questions that may generate fresh insights into the difficulty in 
determining whether a taking is required in the public interest, including: does a taking 
involving a third party transfer (the city delegated the taking power to the New London 
Development Corporation) for purposes of economic development serve the public interest? 
Does the public interest equal the increase in new jobs and tax revenue? Should the public 
interest include consideration of sustaining community life cherished by those residents who 
had lived in the area their entire life? Turning to cases considered by the ECtHR, the public 
interest goals pleaded in these cases ʹ including the promotion of economic development or 
social justice ʹ are often vague. 94  As a result, in most cases the decision of whether an 
interference with property rights is required in the public interest becomes a matter that falls 
within the margin of appreciation of the state.95 
We also tend to ignore that an individual may feel one kind of interference brings more justice 
than another kind of interference because he/she sees different kinds of interference through 
not only her/her personal experience but also the communal network(s) he/she belongs to. 
Proportionality deals with the balance between individual interests and µconflicting public 
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LQWHUHVWV¶.96 More precisely, as discussed above, proportionality deals with the balance between 
individual interests and conflicting and overlapping interests of different types of community.  
'LVDJJUHJDWLQJ WKH PHDQLQJ RI WKH SXEOLF LQWHUHVW WR LQFOXGH FRQIOLFWLQJ DQG RYHUODSSLQJ
LQWHUHVWVRIGLIIHUHQWW\SHVRIFRPPXQLW\LVLPSRUWDQWAs Snyder argues:  
 [Interests] serve as analytical tools for understanding legal ideas, institutions, and 
processes, and as such help to define the salient features of ODZ¶s social context« Thus 
they are indispensable to any understanding of the causes and consequences of the 
creation, reproduction, or transformation of law.97  
Seen through the law-and-community approach, the interactions between individual interests 
and the law are mediated by the communal network(s) the individual belongs to. Applying this 
perspective to rethinking compensation relevant to proportionality, many questions will arise: 
is there a unified approach to compensation for takings of property? Or should compensation 
be re-evaluated in relation to different types of community? Let us imagine two scenarios: the 
state, for the public interest, acquires land owned by a large, powerful company and land owned 
by an individual living in a small, close-knit community. In the first scenario, the taking may 
primarily affect instrumental community, so market value compensation may be easily justified 
and the µfair balance¶ test can also be satisfied.  
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In the second scenario, the taking may affect the LQGLYLGXDO¶V interest grounded in non-
instrumental community (traditional community, affective community, and community of 
belief) in additional to instrumental community. The social approach to compensation becomes 
less effective in this context, as it overlooks a variety of communal networks situated between 
individuals and society as a whole. Should considerations be given to the LQGLYLGXDO¶V loss of 
attachment to these non-instrumental types of community as part of the compensation 
provisions? Of course, taking real account of different types of community is difficult and may 
be beyond the capacity of judges. But an additional amount of compensation at least can be 
awarded to reflect such loss.  
(c) Cases Involving Indigenous Peoples and Communal Property 
The communal networks involving indigenous peoples are mainly µnon-instrumental¶ arising 
from co-existence in the same locality and shared language, culture, traditions, identity, and 
historical experience, etc. 98  Although these communal networks now fall within the 
µMXULVGLFWLRQ¶ of some nation-state or other, the governance of such communal networks and 
communal resources involves the recognition of µDQ additional structure of internal rules, 
rights, duties, and beliefs which mediates and shapes the FRPPXQLW\¶V relationship with its 
natural VXUURXQGLQJV¶.99  
The corresponding property regime is often characterised as µWKH FRPPRQV¶ or communal 
property. The notion of the commons or communal property is elusive with many 
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conceptions. 100  Here, I adopt one conception which regards communal property as resources 
owned, used, or governed by a group of people defined by reference to some common 
characteristics.  This conception speaks to the law-and-community approach that sees 
community as networks of social relations held together by a variety of bonds such as 
locality, values and interests; communal property not only recognises these networks of 
social relations but also manifests itself in these social relations. It is difficult to apply the 
µLQGLYLGXDOLVW¶ conception of µSURSHUW\¶ or µSRVVHVVLRQV¶ in this context where property carries 
more of a sense of entitlement and sharing, a right µQRW to be H[FOXGHG¶ and indeed an 
understanding of stewardship of land and other resources. 101 Moreover, some anthropological 
studies of the indigenous SHRSOHV¶ interest in land show that their interest µLV in belonging not 
RZQLQJ¶102  
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The indigenous SHRSOHV¶ communal relationship and perception of property have been 
recognised by the major development of international law, international human rights and µVRIW 
ODZ¶ instruments regarding indigenous peoples since the 1980s.103 Key references are made to 
the ILO (International Labour Organisation, No. 169) Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal People in Independent Countries in 1989 (µ,/2 Convention ¶),104  the UN General 
Assembly of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 2007,105 and 
µWKH Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of 7HQXUH¶ issued by the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations in 2012. 106  Article 1.1 (a) of the ILO 
Convention 169 recognises the status of tribal peoples as communities µZKRVH status is 
regulated wholly or partially by their customs or traditions or by specific laws or UHJXODWLRQV¶ 
Article 13 of the Convention provides that µWKH Convention government shall respect the 
special importance for the cultural and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of their 
relationship with the lands or WHUULWRULHV«DQG in particular the collective aspects of their 
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UHODWLRQVKLS¶. Article 14(1) recognises µDFFHVV to ODQG¶ µ«WR safeguard the right of the peoples 
concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied by them, but to which they have traditionally 
have access for their subsistence and traditional DFWLYLWLHV¶ That those international instruments 
have taken into account non-instrumental community has given them some kind of cultural 
legitimacy.  
Non-instrumental community, however, does not exist by isolating itself from other types of 
community. Conflicts between non-instrumental community and instrumental community may 
arise in instances where modern economic activities interfere with indigenous tenure and give 
rise to µdispossession¶ and threats to accustomed security of access to communal resources. 
The perceptions of just takings of property within non-instrumental community may be 
fundamentally different from those within µLQVWUXPHQWDO FRPPXQLW\¶.  
Compared to those international instruments discussed above, the evolution of the 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR regarding indigenous peoples is rather slow. Several cases 
involving indigenous peoples heard before the Court show that the ECHR is not very effective 
in cases involving communal relationships and communal property.107 As discussed above, the 
ECHR is not rooted in all types of community, and its regulatory ambition to govern all types 
of community faces an enduring problem of securing legitimacy.  
 
The protection afforded by the ECHR is mostly procedural rather than substantive, and 
indigenous complaints have primarily relied on Article 6 and 8 and A1P1 of the ECHR. There 
has been a lack of landmark cases decided by the ECtHR in favour of indigenous peoples.108 
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Indigenous peoples have to carry the burden of proof to argue for their µLPPHPRULDO use ULJKWV¶ 
over communal resources.109  
 
In Hingitaq 53 and Others v. Denmark,110 428 individuals from the Thule District in Greenland, 
together with Hingitaq 53, a group representing the interests of relocated Inughuit (the Thule 
Tribe) and their descendants, claimed compensation for the deprivation of their homeland and 
reduced hunting and fishing opportunities as a result of the establishment of an air base. The 
Supreme Court of Denmark argued that µWKH Thule Tribe does not constitute a tribal people or 
a distinct indigenous people within or coexisting with the Greenlandic SHRSOH¶111 The ruling of 
the ECtHR supported the argument by the Supreme Court of Denmark that the Thule tribe does 
not µUHWDLQ some or all of its own social, economic, cultural and political LQVWLWXWLRQV¶112 and 
therefore the Thule tribe is not a distinct indigenous people and does not fall within Article 1.1 
(b) of the ILO Convention 169 and does not hold separate rights under the Convention.113  
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The ECtHR found that Danish authorities successfully struck a balance between the general 
interest of the community and the proprietary interests of the persons concerned and therefore 
there was no violation of A1P1.  The ECtHR, however, did not recognise that even if we cannot 
assume the absolute homogeneity of the Inughuit as an indigenous people, the reduced hunting 
and fishing opportunities interfered with not only individual interest but also the communal 
networks held together by custom and tradition (traditional community) within the Greenlandic 
people. The ECtHR only considered whether compensation provided was appropriate to meet 
the interests of the individuals concerned rather than the interests of the group whose lifestyle 
and identity is closely related to hunting and fishing activities. The exercise of their collective 
rights as Inughuit had been µUHGXFHG to just an empty VKHOO¶ as argued by the applicants.114  
 
In Chagos Islanders v United Kingdom, 115  the ECtHR declared the LVODQGHUV¶ case to be 
inadmissible on the grounds that the applicants had previously accepted compensation from 
the British government and had therefore effectively renounced their right to bring any further 
claims.116 The battle between the Chagos Islanders and the UK government began in the 1960s 
when the UK government, which owns the territory, leased Diego Garcia, the largest part of 
the Islands, to the US. Under pressure from the Chagossian campaigners, in 1982, the UK 
government offered a compensation package with a payment of £4 million [$6 million] and 
provision of land worth £1 million [$1.5 million] by Mauritius. However, controversy 
surrounding the compensation centred on the fact that many islanders did not receive 
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compensation, and that those who did receive compensation were not aware that accepting the 
compensation meant µVLJQLQJ away their right to UHWXUQ¶. 117   More importantly, monetary 
compensation did not truly reflect the loss of the islanders. The deportation from the island 
adversely affected around 2000 local residents who had used the land communally over 
generations. Many fell into poverty and lost their sense of belonging to their old community.118  
As Allen argues: 
Exile deprived the Chagossian people of their ancestral lands and access to communal 
territorial resources. However, its impact goes beyond material losses. Expulsion 
produced experiences of ³SURIRXQG cultural and landscape EHUHDYHPHQW´ that have been 
transmitted down the generations so that they have become ingrained in the Chagossian 
psyche. An important manifestation of this loss is the lack of access to ancestral burial 
grounds. Chagossian social relations manifest a strong inter-generational dimension; 
traditional practices, which involved visiting, honouring and maintaining ancestral 
graves, remain culturally significant. However, the inability of Chagossians to perform 
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such practices since expulsion reinforces the severance of wider cultural 
connections.119  
The deportation had adverse social, cultural, environmental and spiritual impact on not only 
the islanders as individuals but also the intergenerational, relational aspect of the group as a 
whole. However, the compensation package did not take such losses into account. More 
remedial measures should be considered, for example, facilitating the restoration of solidarity 
of the communal networks adversely affected by takings. Here a useful comparator may be 
developments in environmental law regarding compensation for environmental damage: 
compensation should µconsist of repairing/restoring the affected natural environment ³LQ NLQG´ 
or to its natural state¶.120 For takings cases involving indigenous peoples, it seems just to allow 
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indigenous peoples µWR return to their traditional territories when the reasons for their 
banishment cease to H[LVW¶.121 
Conclusion: Establishing a Law-and-community Approach to Compensation 
Takings of property are an area that witnesses the increasing penetration of 
national/supranational/international law into both the macro and micro levels of society. 
Studying takings, therefore, requires a sociological analysis of the role of law in social 
experience and the ODZ¶V interaction with vested interests and social relations. Whether takings 
can be socially justified is largely dependent on how law engages with different interests and 
social relations. This article offers a useful analytical tool for examining such engagement 
through applying and developing a law-and-community approach. In this approach, the abstract 
notion of society has been disaggregated into different types of community, coexisting, 
overlapping and interpenetrating. A socially justified taking requires law to not only engage in 
different types of community but also strengthen cooperation within and between different 
types of community.  
It should be noted that, in practice, as national/supranational/international law is not often 
rooted in all the communal networks it purports to regulate, it would be potentially very 
difficult for the Contracting States to permit the ECtHR to engage in this kind of analysis in 
most cases. However, the law-and-community approach is still useful, because it allows us to 
re-evaluate the current approaches to compensation for taking of property under the ECHR. 
The amount of market value compensation is a matter that falls within the margin of 
appreciation of the state, subject to European supervision in the light of the proportionality 
principle. If a taking predominately interferes with instrumental community, the market value 
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approach to compensation may be easily justified. But if the taking also affects types of non-
instrumental community, the market value approach becomes less effective, as the market 
value approach often concentrates on the economic loss of individuals in takings of property 
and overlooks the needs to consider the loss of communal interests and identities especially in 
cases involving indigenous peoples.  The ECtHR should not assume that market value 
compensation is viewed as just compensation by everyone or necessarily strikes a fair 
balance.122 
The social approach to compensation is based on an understanding that property carries certain 
social functions and property owners bear social obligations. However, the µpublic LQWHUHVW¶ 
that is essential for justifying this approach is too broad and vague seen through the law-and-
community approach. The LQGLYLGXDO¶V conception of the public interest is mediated by the 
communal network(s) he/she belongs to. Like the market value approach, the social approach 
overlooks a wide range of types of community between individuals and the state and conflicting 
and overlapping interests of different types of community.  
The limits of the current approaches to compensation for takings of property are also manifest 
in the (&+5¶V limited protection for indigenous SHRSOHV¶ property rights. The ECHR lacks 
groundings in communal networks held together by custom and tradition, and the ECtHR has 
an ambivalent attitude towards the recognition of communal property rights.  
The law-and-community approach can remedy the shortcomings of the current approaches in 
at least three aspects.  First, it helps recognise property rights whose legitimacy may derive 
from communal networks which are composed of intergenerational social relations between 
individuals and groups of people with respect to the land and other natural resources. These 
social relations are shaped and reshaped by a variety of bonds such as shared tradition and style 
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of life. For cases involving indigenous peoples, if we recognise such social relations, we can 
argue that these JURXSV¶ land rights µH[WHQG beyond ownership rights to include possessory and 
use rights over lands traditionally accessed for subsistence and other SXUSRVHV¶.123  
Second, when there are conflicts between different rights claims, or, indeed, conflicts between 
different communal networks, there needs to be at least a process of dialogue and consultation 
or overarching international guidelines so that one group of social interests will not easily be 
trumped by another kind of social interest and vice versa.  The law-and-community approach 
to compensation rejects the simple quantification of the indigenous SHRSOHV¶ losses without 
prior consultation and consent. The law-and-community approach to compensation also rejects 
a one-size-fits-all solution. Compensation provisions for a taking predominately affecting 
instrumental community may not be suitable for a taking predominately affecting traditional 
community.  
 
Finally, as communal networks transcend the boundaries of the nation-state, cutting across the 
local and the globe, the law-and-community approach will be useful for developing takings 
law from a global perspective.  For example, it will be helpful to develop the jurisprudence of 
the ECtHR through keeping pace with the progress of international law, international human 
rights and µVRIW ODZ¶ instruments regarding indigenous peoples.124 These instruments recognise 
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property rights based on communal use and access of land and other resources and community 
PHPEHUV¶ participation in decision-making and governance of the communal resources, 
emphasise the economic, social, cultural, environmental and spiritual impact of takings on local 
and traditional communities, and are open to global participation. In this way, the wide margin 
of appreciation enjoyed by national authorities in justifying takings of property and deciding 
relevant compensation provisions may be limited and subject to international supervision.  
